A geography of illicit crops (coca leaf) and armed conflict in Colombia

Colombia is currently the world’s largest producer of coca leaf and the principal producer of opium poppies in the Americas; the plants are the basic raw materials used to produce cocaine and heroin. This document analyses the current relationship between these crops and illegal armed groups in Colombia, using the hypothesis that the geographical intensification of the conflict is the principal cause of expanding illicit crop production. This relationship was analysed using a theoretical model, in which an interaction between illegal armed activity and strategic territorial control lead to cocaine production. Spatial analysis techniques were then applied, especially spatial association indicators; and a clear spatial dynamic was observed, related to the two aspects mentioned above. Non-parametric exercises were also carried out using matching estimators, to determine the effect illegal armed groups have on coca crops, and also to analyse the efficiency of aerial eradication policies. The results suggest that a large percentage of coca production in Colombia is due to the effects of illegal armed activity. We therefore conclude that the expansion of illegal crop growing is a consequence of the expanding conflict. In contrast, coca crops can only be used to explain a small part of the armed conflict in Colombia. In addition, we found that crop eradication via aerial spraying has not been an efficient tool in the fight against coca production in the country

A GEOGRAPHY OF ILLICIT CROPS (COCA LEAF) AND ARMED CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA

Colombia is currently the world´s largest producer of coca leaf and the principal producer of opium poppies in the Americas; the plants are the basic raw materials used to produce cocaine and heroin. This document will analyse the current relationship between these crops and illegal armed groups in Colombia, using the hypothesis that the geographical intensification of the conflict is the principal cause of expanding illicit crop production. This relationship was analysed using a theoretic model, in which an interaction between illegal armed activity and strategic territorial control lead to cocaine production. Spatial analysis techniques were then applied, especially spatial association indicators; and a clear spatial dynamic was observed, related to the two aspects mentioned above. Non parametric exercises were also carried out using matching estimators, to determine the effect illegal armed groups have on coca crops, and also to analyse the efficiency of aerial eradication policies. The results suggest that a large percentage of coca production in Colombia is due to the effects of illegal armed activity. We therefore conclude that the expansion of illegal crop growing is a consequence of the expanding conflict. In contrast, coca crops can only be used to explain a small part of the armed conflict in Colombia. In addition, we found that crop eradication via aerial spraying has not been an efficient tool in the fight against coca production in the country.Illicit crops

CONFLICT, DECENTRALISATION AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE IN COLOMBIA, 1974-2004

The objective of this paper is to determine the variables that explain the geographical expansion and armed activity of Colombian irregular groups since the mid seventies, taking into account the role of the political, fiscal and budgetary decentralization and its effects over local governance. This period of Colombian history (1974-2004) has been graved by strong economic, social and institutional changes that have deepened particularly since the decentralization process of the mid eighties. In fact, this paper states that decentralization process transformed the conflict into a dispute over the local power, intensifying the use of violence in order to appropriate part of the public goods and resources, interfere the political process and consolidate the group´s territorial control. The analysis of the illegal group´s early activity (1974-1982) shows that the use of violence is explained by grievances such as poverty or inequality. However, subsequent years reveal deep changes in the illegal group´s strategic procedures in which the decentralization process have given them incentives to control the local governments by using violence (greed). The results demonstrate a strong and significant relationship between the intensification of the armed conflict and the greater political, budgetary and fiscal autonomy of local governments. In fact, the presence of local resources such as royalties and taxes triggers violence against politicians being more intense in the municipalities where the actions of the illegal groups are higher.Armed conflict, Violence, Decentralization, Local governance, Spatial Econometrics

Colombia 2020 Human Rights Report and Practices

Colombia is a constitutional, multiparty republic. Presidential and legislative elections were held in 2018. Voters elected Ivan Duque Marquez president in a second round of elections that observers considered free and fair and the most peaceful in decades. The government took steps to investigate, prosecute, and punish officials who committed human rights abuses, although some cases continued to experience long delays. Illegal armed groups, including dissidents of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), National Liberation Army (ELN), and drug-trafficking gangs, continued to operate. Illegal armed groups, as well as narcotics traffickers, were significant perpetrators of human rights abuses and violent crimes and committed acts of extrajudicial and unlawful killings, extortion, and other abuses, such as kidnapping, torture, human trafficking, bombings, restriction on freedom of movement, sexual violence, recruitment and use of child soldiers, and threats of violence against journalists, women, and human rights defenders. The government investigated these actions and prosecuted those responsible to the extent possible

Quantification of the financial resources required to repair victims of the Colombian conflict in accordance with the Justice and Peace Law

The Justice and Peace Law includes a mechanism under which victims of the Colombian conflict can seek reparation from illegal armed groups. This investigation estimates the potential financial cost to illegal armed groups with respect to the reparation of all victims. It provides a variety of different possible valuations for different categories of victims to which harm occurred between 1964 and 2005. It then combines certain of these valuations to give a feasible estimate of between $55,544,152 and$96,359,032 million pesos of 2006, representing between 19% and 33% of GDP. It is hoped that this investigation will benefit the current discussion regarding reparation of victims and any future balancing of legal obligations with political and resource constraints.

THE OBLIGATION TO LEGISLATE CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE COLOMBIAN CRIMINAL CODE

The Republic of Colombia has suffered the struggles of an internal armed conflict for more than forty years. Through time, different Colombian governments have tried to negotiate peace and begin the process of demobilization with various illegal guerrilla and paramilitary groups. The most successful peace process with a guerilla group has been the reincorporation into civilian life of the rebel group M19 in 1990. However, since then little has been achieved in terms of peace. Since 1990, various governments have attempted to conduct peace negotiations with other illegal armed groups. The most relevant of such efforts were the peace negotiations of 1998 to 2002 between the administration of former Colombian president Andrés Pastrana and the Armed Rebel Forces of Colombia (FARC, the biggest guerrilla group). Unfortunately, these negotiations failed and in the meanwhile the FARC gained territorial power. In fact, since then both the FARC and paramilitary groups increased their numbers. In 2002, the government of former president Álvaro Uribe initiated a process of transitional justice. Its principal goal was the demobilization of the paramilitary group AUC (Colombian United Self-defense Group) and achieved justice. Little has been done in this regard. Poor results have been achieved throughout the prosecutions which have been done until now.

Armed Conflict dispossession of land and the cattle activity: An inXuiring between the unofficial testimony and the state numbers in the Department of 4eta Colombia

This article studies the existent relationship between the armed conflict, the dispossession of land and the cattle activity in the municipalities of the Department of Meta in Colombia. Through cluster analysis, using regressions and the confrontation of the story of some victims of the armed conflict and the dispossession of land, it is possible to show the main findings of this investigation. The comparison among the diverse results indicates that the cattle activity and the spoil of land are related to the armed conflict. On the other hand, evidence has been found to reveal the relationship between the presence of armed groups, illegal crops and the unsteadiness of this Department’s social and economic development. Due to its effects through the time and its impact on the region, these last factors also affected negatively the social and economic development of each of the municipalities analyzed during the period from 2000 to 200

Colombia’s Environment and Native People, Victims of Illegal Gold Mining

Colombia’s gold mining industry has historically been rife with criminality, creating an immense black market for the precious metal. Criminal organizations including the National Liberation Army (ELN), dissident groups of the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and other criminal gangs exploit Colombia’s large gold reserves, financing multiple criminal activities, such as the illegal arms trade and money laundering

The Gray Zone of Irregular Forces: Politically Sanctioned, Local Defense, and Organized Crime Groups in the Philippines

The persistent presence of armed groups in local communities is largely due to ineffective community security management, weak rule of law, and the constant shift in peace and security policy guidelines. Compounding the problem is the limited capacity of local government units and the lack of strong political will of officials to address security issues. Irregular forces offering private security services thrive in this environment. Armed groups gain legitimacy since they fill security service gaps in communities and because they assist government security forces in their counterinsurgency operations. Gray zone activities are activities by armed groups that happen in-between the space of nonviolent and violent actions, legal and illegal policy environment, and legitimate and illicit engagements. The tenuous policy environment creates the political opportunity for these groups, and the dysfunctional rule of law and ineffective management of security provide the context for irregular forces to mobilize and operate. The paper looks at the threat landscape and the contemporary security problems that make it difficult to clearly distinguish what is legal, legitimate, and appropriate in appraising irregular forces. It likewise highlights the problematic nature of politically sanctioned groups or groups created based on peace agreements and how vulnerable they are to cross over to criminal groups, if not terror groups